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Editorial on the Research Topic
Prosocial and Antisocial Behavior in Economic Games
In this Research Topic, a collection of research and review articles contribute to our understanding
of the factors influencing human prosocial and antisocial behavior in economic games. Under the
labels of “prosocial” and “antisocial” behavior we consider all those actions that help or hurt others,
respectively. While the prosocial, bright side of human behavior has received much attention in
more than two decades, its antisocial, dark side is far less studied. This Research Topic aims to
combine both sides into a comprehensive account of human social behavior.
The games that are used in the different studies are typically derivations of well-known andmuch
studied setups such as the Public Goods, Ultimatum, Trust and Dictator Games, all invented in the
80’s and 90’s. However, many of our discussed articles include new measures and techniques from
biology and neuroscience (e.g., digit ratio, fMRI, skin conductance) or psychology (e.g., cognitive
reflection, self-control, meditation) which in the first decades of the study of social behavior using
economic games were alien to economists. This could only happen through a strong and fruitful
interaction between economists, psychologists, biologists and neuroscientists in the past 15 years.
Several articles in the Research Topic have focused primarily on prosocial behaviors discussing
concepts like altruism, cooperation, fairness and efficiency (typically in opposition to pure
self-interest). These include Rand and Kraft-Todd, Schniter and Sheremeta, Jaber-López et al., Volz
et al., Raihani and Bshary, Galizzi and Nieboer, Kuss et al., Espinosa and Kovarik, Gesiarz and
Crockett, Arruñada et al., Bejarano et al., Clots-Figueras et al., and Chierchia and Coricelli.
Others have also added analyses or discussions about antisocial behaviors, introducing notions
such as punishment, envy, spite or intergroup competition. These include Chen and Perc, McCall
et al., Nash et al., Zhu et al., Everett et al., Azar et al., Cárdenas and Mantilla, Hu et al., Fatás and
Mateu, Ponti and Rodríguez-Lara, Espín et al., Corgnet et al., Andrighetto et al., and Fischer et al.
One particularly prominent strand of this research has studied the cognitive basis of
prosocial and antisocial behaviors building on the distinction between automatic/intuitive and
controlled/deliberative cognitive processes (i.e., from a dual-process perspective). Rand and
Kraft-Todd find that individuals cooperate more in a one-shot Public Goods Game (PGG) when
they are forced to decide quickly, which prompts intuitive decision-making, compared to a
“deliberative” condition where they are forced to delay their choices. In addition to this result,
which corroborates previous findings (e.g., Rand et al., 2012, 2014), they find that when the payoff
structure of the PGG is manipulated in such a way that cooperation is payoff-maximizing, the
effect of intuition vs. deliberation no longer exists. These findings are in line with the Social
Heuristics Hypothesis developed in Rand et al. (2014), which states that humans internalize social
behaviors that are beneficial in real-life long-run interactions and apply them intuitively to one-shot
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encounters where they are disadvantageous. Kuss et al. classify
subjects according to their social value orientation (Van Lange
et al., 1997) into proselfs and prosocials and analyze the brain
activation patterns during money-allocation decisions using
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). When being
prosocial is not costly, the authors find that prosocial choices
are associated with increased activation in the ventromedial
and dorsomedial prefrontal cortices, especially in the proself
sample. These results are consistent with the argument that
prosocial decisions in those classified as prosocials are more
intuitive, whereas they demand more active deliberation in
proself individuals. Relatedly, Espinosa and Kovarik reanalyze
data from previous experiments and suggest that gender may
also moderate the connection between cognitive processing and
prosocial behavior: encouraging deliberation/reflection seems to
decrease the prosociality of males but not females.
To the extent that strategic reasoning may be related to
reflection (e.g., Brañas-Garza et al., 2012), the results of Arruñada
et al. also provide interesting insights into the cognitive basis of
social behavior. The authors find that strategic reasoning capacity
is unrelated to prosocial vs. selfish choices at the individual level.
From a neuroscientific perspective, Nash et al. review
previous evidence on the role of self-control for both prosocial
and antisocial (i.e., punishment) decisions in an attempt to
identify stable individual neural differences (mainly using
resting-state electroencephalography and structural magnetic
resonance imaging) that may account for individual differences
in social preferences at the trait level. This review highlights
the importance of the lateral prefrontal cortex in encoding
cooperation and punishment behaviors. Along these lines,
Corgnet et al. and Ponti and Rodríguez-Lara perform a
trait-level analysis of the relationship between (distributional)
social preferences and cognitive reflection, as measured by
the Cognitive Reflection Test (Frederick, 2005; Toplak et al.,
2014). Although following different methodologies, both studies
arrive at similar conclusions: a more deliberative (vs. intuitive)
cognitive style is related to a lower influence of “envy” (i.e.,
aversion to disadvantageous inequality) in decision-making.
The relationship between cognitive styles and “compassion”
(i.e., aversion to advantageous inequality), however, is more
complex. These findings are consistent with a link of deliberation
with “mild altruism” and self-interest, and of intuition with
both egalitarian and spiteful preferences. Moreover, these
relationships may help explain why a number of previous studies
analyzing participants’ single decisions in economic games have
reported seemingly inconsistent findings (Corgnet et al.).
Gesiarz and Crockett provide a novel framework inspired
by research on reinforcement learning in which social behavior
stems from the interaction between three decision-making
systems: a goal-directed system that selects actions based on
their predicted consequences, a habitual system that selects
actions based on their reinforcement history, and a Pavlovian
system that emits reflexive responses based on evolutionarily
prescribed priors. This three-system framework, although it
shares many similarities with classical dual-process models in
psychology, offers a promising new perspective to rationalize
previous findings for which dual-process theory may fall short
in providing an explanation.
Another prolific area of research in the Research Topic has
focused on sanctioning (i.e., rewarding cooperators or punishing
non-cooperators) behaviors and institutions. Previous research
has highlighted the pivotal role of sanctions for the establishment
of cooperation among humans (e.g., Yamagishi, 1986; Fehr
and Gächter, 2002; Cuesta et al., 2008; Rand et al., 2009).
Using evolutionary game theory, Chen and Perc derive the
conditions for institutional reward and punishment to maximize
cooperation in the PGG under scale-free networks. Their results
indicate that both the strength of the synergetic effects of
group interactions and the role of the sanctioned individuals’ in
the social network (i.e., how influential they are, as measured by
the degree of the node they occupy) need to be considered for the
design of optimal sanctioning institutions.
In a series of finitely-repeated PGG experiments, Fischer
et al. compare the capacity of centralized and decentralized
punishment institutional regimes for sustaining cooperation
under different information conditions. Both punishment
regimes lead to similar aggregate behavior when information
about others’ cooperation is either perfect or extremely
noisy. However, at intermediate levels of noise, decentralized
punishment erodes efficiency—but not cooperation—compared
to the centralized regime partly due to the higher prevalence
of spiteful, “antisocial punishment” (Herrmann et al., 2008)
targeted at cooperators. In general, antisocial punishment is rare
when one randomly selected group member monopolizes the
power to punish, whereas it is often observed when all group
members can punish each other. Fatás and Mateu show that
the payoff structure of the cooperation mechanism may also
modulate the presence of (decentralized) antisocial punishment
and study how this affects cooperation in a finitely-repeated
experiment. They compare the standard PGG framework, where
the group profit is determined by the linear aggregation of
cooperation levels (the average contribution to the group
account), with the Weakest-Link Mechanism (WLM), where
the group profit is a multiple of the minimum contribution
in the group. The results demonstrate that the presence of
antisocial punishment prevents the establishment of cooperation
and reduces efficiency in the standard PGG but not in the
WLM, in which antisocial punishment is rare. Another type of
punishment that can hamper rather than enforce cooperation
is counter-punishment (Nikiforakis, 2008). Andrighetto et al.
conducted finitely-repeated PGG experiments with and without
communication between participants where punishment and
counter-punishment were possible. Their results show that
given fixed identifiers, so that group members can track
each other’s behavior across periods, the key factor is the
presence of communication. Communication leads to increases
in cooperation and efficiency, regardless of counter-punishment
opportunities.
Regarding the psychology of sanctioning behavior, Espín et al.
study whether punishment in a large-scale one-shot Ultimatum
Game (UG) experiment can be predicted by the participants’
preferences for short-run vs. long-run outcomes (i.e., their
intertemporal preferences). Previous results indicate that more
impatient, short-run oriented individuals are more willing to
reject low offers (i.e., punish the proposer) as responders in the
one-shot UG (Crockett et al., 2010). Since the punishment of
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low offers in the UG can arise from both fairness and spiteful
motivations (e.g., Brañas-Garza et al., 2014), Espín et al. analyze
whether “impatient punishers” are themselves fair or unfair when
playing as proposers in the game. Higher impatience predicts
a higher likelihood of both punishing low offers as responders
and making low offers as proposers, which suggest that the
short-run motivation in the UG is to spitefully reduce the other
player’s payoff rather than equalize the players’ payoffs (i.e.,
fairness). This result mimics previous evidence from the one-
shot PGG where more impatient individuals were more likely to
(spitefully) punish non-cooperative group members while being
non-cooperative themselves (Espín et al., 2012).
McCall et al. analyze experimentally the effect of long-term
compassion meditation on punishment behavior in a one-shot
game similar to the UG. They find that, compared to controls,
compassion meditators are less likely to punish stingy proposers,
suggesting that punishment has a strong spiteful component
in second-party situations such as the UG, in line with the
arguments of Espín et al. However, compassion meditators and
controls do not differ in their willingness to punish low offers
received by others when acting as third-party punishers, which
indicates that third-party punishment is more influenced by
moralistic norm-enforcement and less influenced by spite or
vengeance, compared to second-party punishment (Crockett
et al., 2013). Finally, McCall et al. also observe that compassion
meditators are more likely than controls to compensate the
victim when given the opportunity as third-party observers.
Using fMRI, Hu et al. investigate the neurobiological
underpinnings of third-party punishment and compensation
behavior in one-shot interactions. They find that both behaviors
are associated with activation in the bilateral striatum, which
suggests that people may derive satisfaction from both punishing
the norm-violator and compensating the victim. In addition, the
observed functional connectivity between the bilateral striatum
and the lateral prefrontal cortex during both types of decisions
suggests that paying a cost to punish the violator or to
compensate the victim requires controlling a selfish impulse.
The ventral medial prefrontal cortex, however, is differentially
connected with the bilateral striatum during punishment,
suggesting that the integration of emotional information might
play a more important role in punishment than in compensation
decisions.
Intergroup competition has attracted a non-negligible share
of attention in this Research Topic. The desire to outcompete
other groups is considered one of the possible motivational
factors driving cooperation in humans, a pattern of behavior
that seems to have solid evolutionary roots (Henrich, 2004).
Cárdenas and Mantilla run finitely-repeated PGG experiments
with and without intergroup competition. In both treatments
subjects receive feedback about their relative performance
within their group and about the relative performance of
their group with respect to other groups. In the treatment
with intergroup competition, subjects belonging to high
relative performance groups earn extra money whereas without
intergroup competition the feedback on groups ranking is
merely informative. Even though intergroup competition
increase within-group cooperation in line with the equilibrium
predictions, the authors find that individuals with low relative
performance reduce their contributions to the public good while
groups with low performance increase theirs, regardless of the
treatment.
Zhu et al. observe that children as young as 2.5–3.5 years
already display ingroup favoritism, and to a larger extent than
5.5–6.5 year-olds. However, the older group is more fairness-
oriented (i.e., more egalitarian) than the younger group when
intergroup competition is absent, which suggests that as children
age ingroup favoritism is substituted by a more generalized sense
of fairness.
In a thorough literature review on ingroup favoritism
in economic games, Everett et al. distinguish between the
preferences approach and the beliefs approach and conclude
that both types of considerations seem to matter. Thus,
individuals may favor their group because their social preferences
change according to group membership (ingroup love, outgroup
derogation) but also because they expect more reciprocal
behavior from ingroup than outgroup members. Moreover,
both types of considerations may reinforce each other (e.g.,
stereotypes, as one form of beliefs, may shape preferences) and
whether one or the other consideration dominates could depend
on a number of factors.
Azar et al. explore beliefs in a multi-period UG experiment
where participants face a different partner in each period. The
authors find that even though proposers’ beliefs about the
minimal acceptable offer does not change following a rejection,
they increase their offers if they were rejected in the previous
period. Furthermore, responders are more likely to reject an
offer when the offer falls short of either their expectations
about the amount that will be offered to them or the minimal
amount they believe other responders will accept. Beliefs are
also key for understanding behavior in situations such as
the Trust Game (TG) and Coordination Games. Schniter and
Sheremeta study how communication and emotions shape trust
and trust re-extension in a (unexpected) second TG interaction.
They find that emotions triggered by interaction outcomes are
predictable and also predict subsequent apology and trust re-
extension. The role of emotions in behavioral regulation may
help explain why communication is produced, when messages
can be trusted, and when trust will be re-extended. In one-
shot Coordination Game experiments, Chierchia and Coricelli
observe that expected payoffs, and under certain conditions also
the likelihood of coordination, tend to increase with the level
of (experimentally induced) perceived similarity between the
players. Further experiments suggest that the observed effects
should not be reduced to liking similar others (“homophily”) but
it is also about predicting them.
In one-shot TG with uncertainty about the benefits from
trust (i.e., the trustor does not know by how much the trusted
amount is increased before reaching the trustee), Clots-Figueras
et al. study how trustees use deception to influence the trustor’s
behavior. They find that about two-thirds of trustees send false
messages about the benefits from trust and half of them are
believed by the trustor. However, some trustees lie to benefit
themselves whereas others lie to increase the pie and then share
it equally with the trustor.
Volz et al. explore the neural basis of deception in the
TG using fMRI and observe that the right temporo-parietal
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junction, the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, the (pre)cuneus,
and the anterior frontal gyrus encode the contrast between lying
and truth telling. Further contrasts show that brain activation
can reveal an individual’s veridical intention to deceive others
in order to increase her own payoff, regardless of whether
deception involves lying or telling the truth when the message
is expected not to be believed (i.e., sophisticated deception).
Jaber-López et al. experimentally analyze the behavioral and
physiological patterns of corruption. They find that many
people are prosocial and avoid corrupt, unethical behaviors
even when they could benefit from them. Physiologically, the
participants’ skin conductance responses findings suggest that
stronger emotions are associated with decisions deviating from
pure money maximization, rather than with (un)ethical behavior
per se.
Galizzi and Nieboer replicate previous findings (Brañas-Garza
et al., 2013) on the relationship between 2D:4D digit ratio (a
biomarker of the relative prenatal exposure to testosterone vs.
estrogens) and altruism in a Caucasian sample. In particular,
individuals with an intermediate digit ratio give more money
in a Dictator Game than individuals with either low or high
digit ratios. However, this result does not hold in non-Caucasian
samples, which may suggest an interaction between environment
and hormones in shaping altruistic behavior.
Raihani and Bshary critically review previous theories on
the evolution of human altruism. In particular, they confront
the “mismatch” (Cosmides and Tooby, 1989) and the cultural
group selection (Henrich, 2004) hypotheses. The “mismatch”
hypothesis argues that behavior is constrained by psychological
mechanisms which evolved predominantly in the context of
repeated interactions with known and/or genetically-related
individuals. In contrast, cultural group selection posits that
humans have been selected to cooperate in anonymous one-
shot interactions due to strong intergroup competition, which
creates interdependence among ingroup members. Raihani and
Bshary further discuss alternative routes by which humans could
increase their direct fitness by cooperating with strangers under
natural conditions.
Finally, Bejarano et al. observe prosocial behavior in
an experiment on lifetime investments in enjoyment.
Individuals were permitted to freely chat in two different
treatments: an individual’s rewards from investments in life
enjoyment depend either only on her choices or also on their
similarity to the choices of others, generating a premium on
conformity. Incentives for conformity appear to promote
prosocial behavior, but also increase variance among groups,
leading to convergence on suboptimal strategies for some
groups.
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